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major puzzle in ﬁnancial economics is the apparent drastic inconsis-
tencyofU.S.datawiththeexpectationstheoryofthetermstructureof
interest rates.1 As documented extensively by Campbell and Shiller
(1991), both short changes in long rates and long changes in short rates fail
to be related to existing long-short spreads in even approximately the manner
implied by the expectations theory together with rational expectations; a con-
venient summary of the evidence is provided by Campbell (1995, Table 2).
Thisfailureisanalogous, however, totheapparentdrasticfailureofuncovered
interest parity in foreign exchange, which can be rationalized—it is argued
by McCallum (1994)—as a consequence of monetary policy behavior that is
ignored in the usual regression tests. In the present article it is shown that
a similar result is applicable to the term-structure puzzle. In particular, the
above-mentioned failure is shown to be a plausible consequence of monetary
policy behavior that features interest rate smoothing in combination with pol-
icy responses to movements in the long-short spread.2 This explanation is
For helpful comments on an earlier draft, the author is indebted to John Campbell, Tim
Cook, Spencer Dale, Margarida Duarte, Eugene Fama, Kenneth Froot, Marvin Goodfriend,
David Gruen, Charles Goodhart, Hubert Janicki, Greg Mankiw, Allan Meltzer, Danny Quah,
Tony Smith, John Weinberg, Kenneth West, Julian Wiseman, and Alex Wolman. The views
expressed are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
or the Federal Reserve System.
1 This article is a slightly revised version of NBER Working Paper 4938, issued in November
1994, which has been cited and utilized by a number of authors but not previously published. A
few expositional changes have been made and Section 5 has been added to ﬁll crucial gaps in
the argument and to include a few references to subsequent work.
2 General aspects of the failure are discussed by Cook and Hahn (1990), Campbell and Shiller
(1991), Fama (1984), Mankiw and Summers (1984), and Evans and Lewis (1994), among others.
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entirely consistent with, but more general and more fully developed than, the
one proposed in a notable study by Mankiw and Miron (1986).3
The article’s organization is as follows. In Section 1, the term-structure
puzzleisreviewedandthearticle’srationalizationisdevelopedforthesimplest
two-period case. Then in Section 2, the analysis is extended to long rates of
greatermaturity. AdditionalevidenceisdevelopedinSection3afterwhichthe
article’soriginalconclusionappearsasSection4. Thenashortreviewofmore
recent developments is included in Section 5, where an important difﬁculty
neglected in the original version is described together with a resolution due
to Romh´ anyi (2002). Important subsequent work by Kugler (1997), Hsu
and Kugler (1997), Dai and Singleton (2002), Gallmeyer, Holliﬁeld, and Zin
(2005), and others is brieﬂy discussed.
1. TWO-PERIOD CASE
We begin by considering the basic issue and our proposed explanation for
the two-period case, i.e., for the relationship between yields on one-period
and two-period bonds, denoted rt and Rt respectively. Assuming that the
securities in question are pure discount bonds, the expectations theory of the
term structure posits that the “long” rate Rt is related to rt and the expected
future short rate Etrt+1 as follows:4
Rt = 0.5(rt + Etrt+1) + ξt. (1)
Here Etrt+1 = E(rt+1 |  t) with  t ={ rt,r t−1,...,Rt,R t−1,...} so we are
assuming rational expectations. The random variable ξt is a “term premium”
that is often assumed constant.5 Deﬁning the expectational error  t+1 =
rt+1 − Etrt+1, equation (1) implies
0.5(rt+1 − rt) = (Rt − rt) − ξt + 0.5 t+1.( 2 )
3After ﬁrst drafting the article I became aware of a study with a rather similar objective
by Rudebusch (1994), which is also intended to provide a generalization of the Mankiw-Miron
hypothesis. The type of policy behavior assumed there is quite different, however, as instrument
settings are responsive to current conditions in my setup but are determined exogenously in his.
Most signiﬁcantly, Rudebusch’s analysis does not offer an explanation for the empirical phenomena
rationalized below at the end of Sections 2 and 3.
4 The relationship is exact, if the interest rates are based on continuous compounding, or an
approximation otherwise: see Shiller (1990).
5 Terminologically, many writers deﬁne the expectations hypothesis in a manner that requires
that ξt is a constant. Campbell (1995), for example, does so and also deﬁnes the “pure expectations
theory” as implying that the constant is zero. The deﬁnition used in this article permits a time-
varying ξt but requires that (in the present case) Rt must move point for point with 0.5(rt+
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Then if ξt is assumed constant, ξt = ξ, the orthogonality of  t+1 with Rt and
rt implies that the slope coefﬁcient β in a regression of the form
0.5(rt − rt−1) = α + β(Rt−1 − rt−1) + disturbance (3)
should have a probability limit of 1.0. An estimated value signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from 1.0 is inconsistent with either the expectations theory or one of the
maintained hypotheses.
Infact,ithasbeendocumentedbymanyresearchersthatslopecoefﬁcients
tend to be well below 1.0 in post-1914 data for the United States, often sig-
niﬁcantly so in terms of estimated standard errors. Point estimates obtained
in a number of studies are reported in Table 1. There we see that the slope
coefﬁcient values are all well below 1.0, with the exception of Mankiw and
Miron’s value for 1890-1914 and Campbell and Shiller’s ﬁnal value.6 The
former, which pertains to observations taken before the founding of the Fed-
eral Reserve, will be discussed in Section 3. The latter is accompanied by a
rather large asymptotic standard error that, according to Campbell and Shiller
(1991, 510), seriously understates “the true uncertainty about the regression
coefﬁcients” due to ﬁnite-sample bias.7
One possible explanation for these ﬁndings is, of course, that the expec-
tations theory is simply untrue—but the quantitative extent of the discrepancy
seems implausibly large. Another possibility is invalidity of the rational ex-
pectations (RE) hypothesis,8 but it seems unlikely that the same general type
of systematic expectational error would prevail over different sample periods.
Also, it would again appear that the magnitude of the discrepancy is too large
to be explained by a departure from expectational rationality.9 In any event,
myproposedexplanationisthatξt isnotconstant—i.e., thatthereisavariable
term premium—and that monetary policy is conducted in a manner to be ex-
plained momentarily. The process generating ξt is assumed to be covariance
stationary but not necessarily white noise. For speciﬁcity, the ξt process will
be taken to be autoregressive of order one [AR (1)]:
ξt = ρξt−1 + ut. (4)
Here ut is white noise and | ρ |< 1.0. To this writer it seems implausible
thattherewouldnotbesomeperiod-to-periodvariabilityinthediscrepancyξt
6An analogous result holds for the case of three-month and one-month rates; see Kugler
(1988, 1990).
7 The Roberds, Runkle, and Whiteman (1993) results are for Treasury bills. This study also
reports results using federal funds and repo securities and ﬁnds one slope coefﬁcient close to 1.0
for the former, using the sample period 1979.10–1982.10.
8 This possibility has been explored, using survey data on expectations, by Froot (1989).
9 This point has also been made by Dotsey and Otrok (1995).4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Empirical Results, Two-Period Case
Study Sample Short Slope
Period Rate Coefﬁcient
Mankiw & Miron (1986) 1959–1979 3 mo. 0.23
Mankiw & Miron (1986) 1951–1958 3 mo. -0.33
Mankiw & Miron (1986) 1934–1951 3 mo. -0.25
Mankiw & Miron (1986) 1915–1933 3 mo. 0.42
Mankiw & Miron (1986) 1890–1914 3 mo. 0.76
Evans & Lewis (1994) 1964–1988 1 mo. 0.42
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 1 mo. 0.50
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 2 mo. 0.19
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 3 mo. -0.15
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 6 mo. 0.04
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 12 mo. -0.02
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 24 mo. 0.14
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 60 mo. 2.79
Fama (1984) 1959–1982 1 mo. 0.46
Roberds, Runkle & Whiteman (1993) 1984–1991 3 mo. -0.01
Roberds, Runkle & Whiteman (1993) 1979–1982 3 mo. 0.19
Roberds, Runkle & Whiteman (1993) 1975–1979 3 mo. 0.43
in (1), a random component that reﬂects changes in tastes regarding the need
for ﬁnancial ﬂexibility or any of a myriad of other disturbing inﬂuences, none
major enough to justify separate recognition. In any event, it is not the case
that the inclusion of a random ξt disturbance in (1) converts the expectations
theory into a tautology. That would be true if ξt were related to rt, Etrt+1,
and Rt as in (1) without restriction. But instead the present assumption is
that ξt is exogenous with respect to rt and Rt. This reﬂects the idea that the
expected one-period holding yields on one-period and two-period bonds are
equal up to a constant plus a random disturbance, i.e., that these yields differ
from that constant only randomly. This is, for the case at hand, the essence of
the expectations theory.
Regarding monetary policy, our hypothesis begins with the observation
that actual policy behavior in the United States (and many other nations)
involves manipulation of a short-term interest rate “instrument” or “operating
target.” Speciﬁcally, we assume that 10
rt = σrt−1 + λ(Rt − rt) + ζt, (5)
10 For values of σ less than 1.0, a constant term should also be included in (5) if Eζt = 0.
We have not shown it here, however, because the case with σ = 1 will be featured below and
because little interest attaches to the constant term in any case.B. T. McCallum: Monetary Policy 5
where σ ≥ 0 is presumed to be close to 1.0 and λ ≥ 0 to be smaller than 2.11
Thus there is a considerable element of interest rate “smoothing”—keeping rt
close to rt−1—and also a tendency to tighten policy (by raising rt) whenever
the spread Rt − rt is larger than normal. Whether this reaction to Rt − rt
occurs because the central bank views it as a good predictor of future output
growthorasagoodindicatorofrecentpolicylaxitydoesnotmatterforcurrent
purposes. The ﬁnal term ζt reﬂects other components of policy behavior. It
wouldnotimpairouranalysistoletζt beautocorrelated, butitwouldnothelp,
either. Accordingly, we shall assume that ζt is white noise.
It may be helpful to brieﬂy consider the rationale for the speciﬁcation
of policy behavior in (5). Regarding the rt−1 term, there exists some con-
troversy regarding the reason behind central banks’proclivity for interest rate
smoothing—and,indeed,fortheiruseofinterestrateinstruments. Butthereis
virtually no disagreement with the proposition that the Fed—and other major
central banks—have in fact employed such practices during most (if not all)
ofthelast50years.12 (Forsomeusefuldiscussion, seeGoodfriend[1991]and
Poole [1991]). In addition (5) reﬂects the assumption that the central bank
tends to tighten policy when the spread Rt −rt is large. One possible rational-
ization is that the spread is an indicator of monetary policy expansiveness, as
suggestedbyLaurent(1988),sothatanunusuallyhighvalueindicatestheneed
for corrective action. A different idea is that the spread provides an indicator
of the state of the economy from a cyclical perspective. Various investigators,
including Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Hu (1993), have documented
that spread measures have predictive value for future real GNP growth rates.
Also, Mishkin (1990) has shown that a spread variable has some predictive
content for future inﬂation rates. Thus an attempt by the central bank to con-
duct a forward-looking countercyclical policy would call for a response of the
type indicated in (5), i.e., a tightening when Rt − rt is high.13 Admittedly,
11 In what follows, λ<2 will be presumed because it seems plausible and is useful—
sufﬁcient, or, necessary for all possible values of ρ—in avoiding inﬁnite discontinuities in φ2,a
coefﬁcient in the solution equation speciﬁed in (7) below. But the solutions obtained below, and
most of the analysis, would continue to prevail with λ ≥ 2.
12 Some analysts are dubious that the Fed’s control over the one-day federal funds rate trans-
lates into effective control over one-month or three-month Treasury bill rates that are the operational
counterpart of rt in (5). But the evidence of Cook and Hahn (1989) suggests that three-month
rates do, in fact, respond within the day to policy-induced changes in the federal funds rate. Fur-
thermore, if the Fed doubted its ability to control Treasury bill rates, it could (given its holdings)
operate directly in the Treasury bill markets. Consequently, doubts concerning the controllability
of rt seem to be unfounded.
13 In an inﬂuential publication, Goodfriend (1993) suggests that the Fed regards (or should
regard?) the long rate as an indicator of “inﬂation scares,” behavior that might be interpreted as
descriptive of a rule of the form rt = δrt−1 + θ(Rt − ¯ R) + ζt. The latter can be written in the
form (5) by deﬁning σ = δ/(1 − θ) and λ = θ/(1 − θ) so our analysis applies. (In this case
dynamic stability (non-explosiveness) requires δ<1 − θ, however, assuming that 0 <θ<1). It
is not clear that Goodfriend would agree with the above formulation of his argument: another
possibility is rt = rt−1 + θ(Rt − Rt−1) + ζt, which would greatly increase the complexity of the
algebra of our analysis. In any event, the policy behavior pattern in his article has a substantial6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
in actual practice the Fed has used other predictor variables in addition to or
instead of the spread. But to the extent that these and the spread are useful
predictors, the policy response would be much the same as implied by (5).
Relations (1) and (5) constitute only a portion, of course, of a
macroeconomic system. But if we assume that the disturbances ξt and ζt are
independent of those in the remaining relations, the system will be recursive
and the subsystem (1)(5) will determine rt and Rt without reference to the
other variables or shocks. Whether the remainder of the model does or does
not feature relations of the IS-LM type is irrelevant, for example, as is the
extent to which prices of goods are ﬂexible. Let us consider, then, a rational
expectations solution to the system (1)(5).14
Presuming that attention is to be focused on the fundamental or bubble-
free solution yielded by the minimal-state-variable (MSV) criterion discussed
by McCallum (1983), we combine (1) and (5) to yield
(1 + λ)rt = σrt−1 + λ[0.5(rt + Etrt+1) + ξt] + ζt (6)
and seek values of the undetermined coefﬁcients φ0,φ1,φ2, and φ3 that will
provide a rt solution of the form
rt = φ0 + φ1rt−1 + φ2ξt + φ3ζt. (7)
Clearly, thelatterimpliesthatEtrt+1 = φ0+φ1(φ0+φ1rt−1+φ2ξt +φ3ζt)+
φ2ρξt so we substitute these into (6) to obtain
(1 + λ)[φ0 + φ1rt−1 + φ2ξt + φ3ζt] = (8)
σrt−1 + λ[0.5(φ0 + φ1rt−1 + φ2ξt + φ3ζt) +
0.5(φ0 + φ1(φ0 + φ1rt−1 + φ2ξt + φ3ζt) + φ2ρξt) + ξt] + ζt.
Thus for (7) to be a solution—i.e., to hold for all ξt, ζt realizations—it must
be true that:
degree of similarity with formulation (5): both call for an increase in the short rate in response
to a ceteris paribus rise in the long rate.
14 Students of the price level determinacy literature—e.g., McCallum (1981)(1986), Dotsey
and King (1983), Canzoneri, Henderson, and Rogoff (1983)—will wonder about the absence of
nominal variables in the system (1)(5). But the price level can be brought in by adding (e.g.)
an IS-type relation in which a real rate such as rt − (Etpt+1 − pt) appears, pt being the log of
the price level. Then determinacy of pt will require the presence of an additional term in the
policy rule (5), one that includes a nominal variable such as pt or Etpt+1 or pt−1. Algebraic
analysis becomes much more difﬁcult because the counterpart of (10) below will be a cubic in
many such cases. But a cubic must have at least one real root, so in principle determinacy can be
investigated. My examination of a case with pt included in (5) indicates that determinacy would
be guaranteed unless σ = 1.0 exactly. Thus for σ close to 1.0, the results would be approximately
the same as those emphasized below.B. T. McCallum: Monetary Policy 7
(1 + λ)φ0 = λφ0 + 0.5λφ1φ0 (9)
(1 + λ)φ1 = σ + 0.5λφ1 + 0.5λφ2
1
(1 + λ)φ2 = 0.5λφ2 + 0.5λφ1φ2 + 0.5λρφ2 + λ
(1 + λ)φ3 = 0.5λφ3 + 0.5λφ1φ3 + 1.
The second of these is satisﬁed by two values of φ1, namely,
φ1 =
(1 + 0.5λ) ± [(1 + 0.5λ)2 − 2λσ]1/2
λ
, (10)
but the MSV criterion implies that the one with the minus sign is relevant.15
Then the remaining coefﬁcients are straightforwardly given by the other three
equalities in (9).
Inanalyzingtheimplicationsofthissolutionitwillbeusefultoemphasize
the important special case involving σ = 1, which is the value suggested by
interest rate smoothing behavior. When σ = 1, the MSV solution for φ1
becomes[(1+0.5λ)−(1−0.5λ)]/λ = λ/λ = 1andtheotherthreeequalities
in (9) are simpliﬁed considerably. They yield φ0 = 0,φ2 = λ/(1 − 0.5ρλ),
and φ3 = 1 so the solution for rt is
rt = rt−1 +
λ
(1 − 0.5ρλ)
ξt + ζt. (11)
Furthermore, Etrt+1 − rt = φ2ρξt, so we ﬁnd that the spread obeys
Rt − rt = 0.5(Etrt+1 − rt) + ξt = (1 − 0.5ρλ)−1ξt. (12)
Finally, equations (11) and (4) imply






ut + ζt, (13)




(Rt−1 − rt−1) +
λ/2
1 − ρλ/2
ut + 0.5ζt. (14)
But here ut and ζt are uncorrelated with Rt−1 − rt−1, so (14) represents a
populationversionoftheregressiondescribedin(3). Thustheslopecoefﬁcient
in(3)isaconsistentestimatorofρλ/2, sotheanalystshouldanticipateaslope
15 This is the root that yields φ1 = 0 when σ = 0, a special case in which it is clear that
rt−1 would be an extraneous state variable (as discussed in McCallum [1983]).8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
well below 1.0. Indeed, if ξt were white noise, with ρ = 0, a slope coefﬁcient
of zero would be implied—even though relation (1) is the main behavioral
relation of the system. That result demonstrates, I would suggest, not only
that the usual regression test is inappropriate but also that it is misleading to
think of the expectations theory in terms of the “predictive content” of the
spread for future changes of the short rate.16 Such predictive content is not a
necessary implication of that theory.
In addition, a zero slope coefﬁcient would be implied if λ = 0, i.e.,
if the central bank did not respond to the current value of the spread but
simply set rt equal to rt−1 (plus, perhaps, ζt). This special case, of the special
case with σ = 1, represents the hypothesis of Mankiw and Miron (1986)—
that the Federal Reserve has practiced extreme interest rate smoothing and
thereby induced short rates to approximate a random walk process in their
behavior. Our result strongly supports the general idea of the Mankiw and
Miron hypothesis, but shows that it holds much more generally (i.e., even if
rt behavior is not that of a random walk).17
A few readers have remarked that (14) appears to be inconsistent with the
fact that a regression of form (3) should yield a slope coefﬁcient of 1.0 in the
special case in which the term premium ξt is a constant. But with σ = 1.0
in (5), a constant ξt implies that Rt − rt is also constant—see equation (12).
Thus there is a degenerate regressor, in this case, so the regression cannot be
conducted. And in the case with σ<1.0, (14) does not apply, so again there
is actually no inconsistency.
Let us now brieﬂy consider the situation with σ<1.0. In such cases we
would need to include a non-zero constant term in (5) to permit a stationary
equilibrium with Eζt = 0. The solution in this case yields a relationship
analogous to (14) that is less tidy than the latter and includes additional prede-
termined variables. But it remains true that the probability limit of the slope
coefﬁcient in a regression of rt − rt−1 on Rt−1 − rt−1 is not in general equal
to 1.0 and is most likely to be smaller than 1.0; a demonstration is provided in
theAppendix. Accordingly, the same general message applies as in the more
tractable case with σ = 1.0. That message is that the realization of (say) a
positive value of ξt will drive up Rt relative to rt via (1). But then Rt −rt will
be negatively correlated with the composite disturbance −ξt−1 + 0.5εt+1 in
16 The claim here is not that it is inappropriate to estimate a relation of the form (3), but
only that it is inappropriate to view a test of β = 1 as a test of the expectations theory.
17 One reader has pointed out correctly that the formal analysis based on (14) presumes that
policy response is to the current-period spread, not a lagged value. The argument of the present
paragraph suggests that the downward-bias effect would be present, nevertheless, if response was
to the lagged spread. In any case, the timing assumed in (5) is consistent with that in much of
the recent literature such as Rudebusch and Wu (2004) or Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2005) when
periods are interpreted as months or six-week intervals.B. T. McCallum: Monetary Policy 9
(3), implying that least-squares estimation of (4) will yield a slope coefﬁcient
that has a probability limit not equal to 1.0.
2. N-PERIOD CASE
Now we turn to the more interesting case in which the long rate, Rt, is for a
bond with a maturity of more than two periods. In this case an approximation
to the expectations-hypothesis relationship between Rt and rt can be written
as
Rt − NEt(Rt+1 − Rt) = rt + ξt, (15)
where N+1 is a measure of the duration of the long rate.18 In (5) the left-hand
side is an approximation to the one-period holding return on the long-rate
bond since N(EtRt+1 − Rt) is the (approximate) expected capital loss on the
long bond. (The inexactness arises because the term Rt+1 should pertain to
a maturity one period less than that for Rt.) Thus for bonds with a distant
maturity date, the approximation should be adequate.19
In this case the apparent empirical failure to be explained arises from
writing (15) as
N(Rt+1 − Rt) = (Rt − rt) − ξt + Nεt+1, (16)
where εt+1 = Rt+1 − EtRt+1 is an expectational error that with RE is un-
correlated with Rt and rt. Thus if ξt were constant, the slope coefﬁcient in
a regression of N(Rt+1 − Rt) on Rt − rt should have a probability limit of
1.0, according to the expectations theory. But such regressions again actually
yield slopes well below 1.0 with U.S. data. Indeed, the values reported by
Evans and Lewis (1994) and Campbell and Shiller (1991) are predominantly
negative, as is documented in Table 2, and increase in absolute value with N.
18 For pure discount bonds, N+1 is the maturity.
19 Equation (15) is based on the expression Rt = (1 − δ) δkEtrt+k + term premium, with
the summation from 0 to ∞, i.e., an inﬁnite-maturity version of the linearization developed by
Shiller (1979), with N = δ/(1 − δ). An exposition is provided by Mankiw and Summers (1984,
pp. 226-7). This approximation has also been used by Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983),
Campbell and Shiller (1991), Fuhrer and Moore (1993), and Hardouvelis (1994). The reason this
approximation is adopted here is so that only two maturities—two endogenous variables—will be
involved in the model.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 2 Empirical Results, N-Period Case
Study Sample Period Short Rate N+1 Slope Coefﬁcient
Evans & Lewis (1994) 1964–1988 1 mo. 2 -0.17
Evans & Lewis (1994) 1964–1988 1 mo. 4 -0.70
Evans & Lewis (1994) 1964–1988 1 mo. 6 -1.27
Evans & Lewis (1994) 1964–1988 1 mo. 8 -1.52
Evans & Lewis (1994) 1964–1988 1 mo. 10 -1.89
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 1 mo. 2 0.00
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 1 mo. 4 -0.44
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 1 mo. 6 -1.03
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 1 mo. 12 -1.38
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 1 mo. 24 -1.81
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 1 mo. 48 -2.66
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 1 mo. 60 -3.10
Campbell & Shiller (1991) 1952–1987 1 mo. 120 -5.02
Hardouvelis (1994) 1954–1992 3 mo. 120 -2.90
As in the last section, we assume that the policy reaction equation (5)
obtains with λ<1/N and that ξt = ρξt−1 +ut.20 Then one can combine (5)
and (15) to obtain
(1 + N)Rt = NEtRt+1 + (1 + λ)−1[σrt−1 + λRt + ζt] + ξt. (17)
The MSV solution will be of the form
Rt = π1rt−1 + π2ξt + π3ζt, (18)
implying EtRt+1 = π1(1 + λ)−1[σrt−1 + λ(π1rt−1 + π2ξt + π3ζt) + ζt] +
π2ρξt, which can be substituted with (18) into (17) to give
(1 + N)[π1rt−1 + π2ξt + π3ζt] = (19)
Nπ1(1 + λ)−1[σrt−1 + λ(π1rt−1 + π2ξt + π3ζt) + ζt] +
Nπ2ρξt + (1 + λ)−1[σrt−1 + λ(π1rt−1 + π2ξt + π3ζt) + ζt] + ξt.
For (18) to be a solution, then, we must have
20 The condition λ<1/N is the condition to prevent inﬁnite discontinuities in π2.I t i s
analogous to, although different than, the condition λ<2 for the two-period case (presumably
because of the approximation in (15)) and is again assumed but not strictly required. That the
larger is N, the smaller should be λ, is intuitive because the response in (5) is now to only one
of the various long rates that could be considered.B. T. McCallum: Monetary Policy 11
(1 + N)π1 = Nπ1(1 + λ)−1(σ + λπ1) + (1 + λ)−1(σ + λπ1) (20)
(1 + N)π2 = Nπ1(1 + λ)−1λπ2 + Nπ2ρ + (1 + λ)−1λπ2 + 1
(1 + N)π3 = Nπ1(1 + λ)−1(λπ3 + 1) + (1 + λ)−1(λπ3 + 1).
The ﬁrst of these amounts to (1 + λ)(1 + N)π1 = (Nπ1 + 1)(σ + λπ1),s o
we have
π1 =




The term in square brackets will be positive, so the MSV solution for π1 is
the expression in (21) with the minus sign.21 Given this value, the second and
third of equations (20) determine π2 and π3.
To facilitate analysis, let us again focus attention on the case with σ = 1.
Then we have [(1 + λ)(1 + N)− (λ + N)]2 = (1 + λ)2(1 + N)2 − 2(1 +
λ)(1+N)(λ+N)+(λ+N)2 = 1+2Nλ+N2λ2, and the term inside curly
brackets in (21) becomes 1 − 2Nλ+ N2λ2 = (1 − Nλ)2. Consequently, we
have π1 = [(1 + Nλ)− (1 − Nλ)]/2Nλ = 1. Then with π1 = 1, the ﬁnal
equation in (20) implies π3 = 1 and π2 = (1 + λ)/[1 + N − Nρ(1 + λ)].
Because 1 > Nλ,π2 is strictly positive. Given these values, we readily see
that
Rt = rt−1 +
1 + λ
1 + N − Nρ(1 + λ)
ξt + ζt (22)
and
rt = rt−1 +
λ
1 + N − Nρ(1 + λ)
ξt + ζt. (23)
Accordingly, the spread variable obeys
Rt = rt +
1
1 + N − Nρ(1 + λ)
ξt (24)
and using (22) and (4) we also have
21Again this is because with σ = 0, rt−1 should not appear in the solution for Rt.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Rt − Rt−1 =
λ + 1
1 + N − Nρ(1 + λ)
ξt −
1
1 + N − Nρ(1 + λ)
ξt−1 + ζt
=
(λρ + ρ − 1)ξt−1 + (1 + λ)ut
1 + N(1 − ρ(1 + λ))
+ ξt (25)
= (λρ + ρ − 1)(Rt−1 − rt−1) +
(1 + λ)
1 + N(1 − ρ(1 + λ))
ut + ζt.
Consequently, we see that a regression of N(Rt − Rt−1) on Rt−1 − rt−1
will have a slope coefﬁcient whose probability limit is N(λρ + ρ − 1) or
−N(1 − ρ(1 + λ)). Clearly, the latter will be negative except for very large
values of ρ and/or λ, and will be larger in absolute value (for a given ρ) with
longermaturities(largerN).22 Inqualitativeterms,bothofthesecharacteristics
match the results of Evans and Lewis (1994) and Campbell and Shiller (1991)
reported above in Table 2.
3. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
The article by Campbell and Shiller (1991) concludes with an attempt to
provide a summary characterization of term structure behavior that would
be consistent with their battery of empirical ﬁndings, which include many
more than those reported here. In their words, “The explanations we will
consider are not ﬁnance-theoretic models of time-varying risk premia, but
simply econometric descriptions of ways in which the expectations theory
might fail” (1991, 510). In terms of the notation of the present article, the two
summary characterizations considered are (for the two-period case)
Rt − rt = 0.5Et(rt+1 − rt) + c + vt, (26)
where vt is added noise that is orthogonal to Etrt+1 − rt, and
Rt − rt = k0.5Et(rt+1 − rt) + c (27)
where k>1. The latter “could be described as an overreaction model of the
yield spread,” according to Campbell and Shiller (1991, 513). They explore
the implications of these two summary characterizations of ways in which the
expectations theory might fail and conclude that (27) is consistent with the
data but that (26) is not.
Let us consider how these characterizations compare with the explanation
of the present article. Looking back at Section 1, we see that equation (12)
22 The policy parameter λ would be expected to be smaller for a larger N. This effect re-
inforces the tendency for the slope coefﬁcient to increase in absolute value with N.B. T. McCallum: Monetary Policy 13
is of a similar form to that of (26), but with the crucial difference that ξt in
(12) is not orthogonal to Etrt+1 − rt. Thus the inadequacy of (26) does not
serve to discredit the model of Section 2. Furthermore, using the expression
Etrt+1 − rt = φ2ρξt to eliminate ξt from (12) results in
Rt − rt = (1/ρλ)Et(rt+1 − rt) (28)
for the model of Section 2. But with 0 <λ<2 and | ρ |< 1, (28) implies
that k>1 in (27) if ρ is positive. So Campbell and Shiller’s summary
characterization is consistent with the present article’s rationalization.23
It was mentioned above that the slope coefﬁcient reported in Table 1 for
the years 1890–1914 was closer (than for more recent periods) to the value of
1.0thathasbeenfocusedoninpreviousinvestigations. AsMankiwandMiron
(1986) emphasize, those years precede the founding of the Federal Reserve
System and therefore pertain to a period during which interest rate smoothing
behavior would be absent. In a similar vein, Kugler (1988) ﬁnds that slope
coefﬁcients are closer to 1.0 for Germany and Switzerland than for the United
States during recent years. This result he attributes to a smaller degree of
interest smoothing behavior by the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank,
in comparison with the Fed, a hypothesized behavioral difference that is con-
sistent with the beliefs of many students of central banking behavior. Since
the model in Sections 1 and 2 presumes a substantial degree of interest rate
smoothing,thisarticle’sexplanationisconsistentwithbothoftheseﬁndings.24
4. REMARKS
The discussion of the foregoing paragraph suggests that one possible way of
conducting additional tests of this article’s hypothesis would be to consider
different monetary policy regimes corresponding to different time periods for
the United States and to different nations. Reaction functions corresponding
to (5) would be estimated and the implications of their parameter values for
thecrucialslopecoefﬁcientsthencomparedwithvaluesofthecoefﬁcientsob-
tained for these different regimes. Now, it may prove possible to make some
progress toward execution of such a study. There is, however, a substantial
difﬁculty that needs to be mentioned. Speciﬁcally, it is the case that actual
central banks do not respond only to term spreads in deciding upon changes
in rt. Thus equation (5) represents a simpliﬁcation relative to actual behavior
of the Fed, which almost certainly responds to recent inﬂation and output or
employment movements as well as the spread. So, if one were to attempt to
23 The foregoing discussion implies, incidentally, that there is actually nothing bizarre or
irrational about a ﬁnding expressible as k>1 in (27).
24 For additional discussion of the Mankiw-Miron hypothesis, see Cook and Hahn (1990).14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
econometrically estimate actual reaction functions, then measures of inﬂation
and output gaps would need to be included. But in that case, values of these
variables would need to be explained endogenously, so the system of equa-
tions in the model would have to be expanded. Furthermore, the dynamic
behavior of inﬂation and output would need to be modeled “correctly,” which
is an exceedingly difﬁcult task given the absence of professional agreement




pliﬁed nature of our policy equation (5), this article’s proposed explanation
might be regarded as more of a parable than a fully worked-out quantitative
model. I would argue, however, that this is not a source of embarrassment, for
most knowledge in economics is actually of the parable type.26 The relevant
issueiswhetheraproposedparableisfruitfulinunderstandingimportanteco-
nomic phenomena. In this particular case the proposed parable suggests that
slope estimates in regressions of the form (3) or (16) differ from 1.0 despite
the validity of a version of the expectations theory of the term structure. This
version permits the holding-period yields on securities of various maturities
to differ by a random discrepancy that is exogenous but perhaps serially cor-
related. The basic idea of the parable is that the estimated slope coefﬁcient
is a composite parameter reﬂecting policy behavior as well as the behavior of
market participants, with the type of policy postulated involving interest rate
smoothing and response to the long-short spread, the latter reﬂecting impor-
tant aspects of the state of the economy. The fact that essentially the same
parable can rationalize a major anomaly in foreign exchange markets must be
regarded as a signiﬁcant mark in its favor.
5. ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Since the article consisting of the foregoing sections was written, there have
been several directly relevant developments. First, Kugler (1997) and Hsu
and Kugler (1997) have conducted empirical studies based on the article’s
framework. In both of these studies, the results are described as supportive
of the “policy reaction” hypothesis. In the process of conducting these em-
pirical investigations, Kugler (1997) developed signiﬁcant extensions of the
article’s theoretical analysis, one example being an application for the case
25 Recently, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) have developed a “high frequency” empirical strat-
egy that yields results for the United States that are basically consistent with policy behavior of
the type hypothesized above.
26 Consider the usual depiction of a production function as yt = f(n t,kt), where the symbols
should not require deﬁnition. Can this depiction be considered anything more than a parable?B. T. McCallum: Monetary Policy 15
in which there are available observations for shorter time periods than those
corresponding to the short rate (itself assumed to match the central bank’s
decision period). This extension is quite useful for econometric analysis of
the model linking term-structure and monetary policy behavior.
Amorefundamentaldevelopmentconcernsabasicproblemwiththefore-
going analysis of the N-period cases in Section 2. Since (15) pertains to







t ) = rt + ξ
(N+1)
t (15 )





used in (15). A crucial question, then, is how are the term premia ξ
(N+1)
t
related to each other? Also, which of the long rates is it that appears in the
monetary policy rule? Evidently, the solution equations (22)–(25) cannot be
correct for all N since each of them implicitly assumes that the particular long
rate being analyzed is the one that appears in the central bank’s policy rule.
Both of these ﬂaws in the Section 2 analysis have been addressed by
Romh´ anyi (2002), who assumes that ξ
(N+1)
t = N t, with  t being the same













ancy, between the bond of duration N+1 (on the one hand) and the one-period
bond plus N periods with the N-period bond (on the other hand), is the same.
This equality is evidently necessary to rule out arbitrage possibilities.
Withrespecttothecentralbank’schoiceofalongratefordeﬁnitionofthe
spread that is used in its policy rule, Romh´ anyi (2002) shows that the crucial
solution equation (24) becomes
R
(N+1)





] t, (24 )
where q is the maturity chosen for the policy rule and where γ q depends
upon q as well as λ and ρ but is the same (given q) for all N—see Romh´ anyi
(2002). For plausible values of λ, ρ, and q the coefﬁcient γ q will be positive
anddecreasinginq. Romh´ anyi’smodiﬁcationthereforeeliminatesthelogical
inconsistencies in the argument of Section 2 above.
Overthepastdecade, 1995–2005, analysisofterm-structurerelationships
has been dominated by no-arbitrage afﬁne factor models, in which (zero-
coupon) bond prices are given by a pricing equation that speciﬁes the pricing
kernel process as an afﬁne (linear with intercept terms permitted) function16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
of unobservable factors (state variables). Then the prices of bonds of all
maturities, which satisfy no-arbitrage conditions, are also afﬁne functions
of the state variables. The substantive content of such models lies in the
speciﬁcation of the number of factors and the process generating the state
variables. Dai and Singleton (2002) have shown that empirical features of
the U.S. term structure data can be well explained by a three-factor afﬁne
model in which the “price of risk” is linearly related to the state variables.
In this context, Dai and Singleton (2002, 436) report that “it turns out that
McCallum’s(1994)resolutionoftheexpectationspuzzlebasedonthebehavior
ofamonetaryauthorityissubstantivelyequivalenttoour[single-factor]afﬁne
parameterization of the market price of risk.”
Veryrecently,Gallmeyer,Holliﬁeld,andZin(2005)havemoreextensively
exploredtherelationofthisarticle’smodelto“endogenous”modelsoftheterm
premium, i.e., models in which the term premia are constrained to obey no-
arbitrage constraints.27 In addition, they study the way in which this article’s
policy rule is related to the policy rule of Taylor (1993), which has been
extremely inﬂuential in both positive and normative analyses of monetary
policy over the past two decades. Quantitative analysis indicates that the two
parameters of this article’s policy rule are plausible for a stochastic volatility
speciﬁcation of state variable behavior but not with a stochastic price-of-risk
speciﬁcation. The latter, however, is shown by Dai and Singleton (2002) to
provideasuperiormatchtoactualU.S.yield-curveproperties. Incombination




Here the concern is with the model of Section 1 when σ<1.0. From (9), we
ﬁnd that







where δ = 1 − (φ1 − 1)λ/2. Then from (A-1) it follows that
Etrt+1 − rt = φ0 + (φ1 − 1)rt + λρ/(δ − ρλ/2)ξt (A-2)
27 Other notable papers that integrate monetary policy and term-structure analyses include
Rudebusch and Wu (2004) and Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2005).B. T. McCallum: Monetary Policy 17
and thus using (12) that
Rt − rt = (1/2)[φ0 + (φ1 − 1)rt + (ρλ/(δ − ρλ/2))ξt] + ξt. (A-3)
Now,equation(2)indicatesthattheplimoftheslopecoefﬁcientonRt−rt inthe
regression (3) will equal 1.0 minus plim T −1ξt(Rt −rt)/ plim T −1(Rt −rt)2.
Its value will be smaller than 1.0, then, if Eξt(Rt − rt) is positive.







which is necessarily positive since the term in parentheses equals
1 + (1 − φ1)λ/2
1 + (1 − φ1)λ/2 − ρλ/2
. (A-5)
Here (1 − φ1)λ/2 is positive, since φ1 < 1 when σ<1 (see below), and
| ρλ/2 |< 1. Thus expression (A-5) is unambiguously positive. The second
component is
(1/2)(φ1 − 1)Ertξt, (A-6)
in which the term φ1 − 1 is negative but will be small for σ (and φ1) close to
1.0. To sign Ertξt, we use (A-1) and (4) as follows, assuming Eξtζt = 0:
Ertξt = E[φ0 + φ1rt−1 + φ2ξt + φ3ζt]ξt (A-7)
= φ1Ert−1ξt + φ2σ2
ξ = φ1Ert−1ρξt−1 + φ2σ2
ξ.






The latter is unambiguously positive since φ2 < 0 and | φ1ρ |< 1. Thus the
second component is negative but will tend to be small relative to the ﬁrst.
It remains to demonstrate that φ1 < 1 when σ<1. But we have found
that
φ1 =
(1 + λ/2) − [(1 + λ/2)2 − 2λσ]1/2
λ
. (A-9)
With 0 <σ<1, we have 2λ>2λσ > 0 so the term in square brackets is
positive and larger than (1−λ/2)2. Thus the value of φ1 is smaller than when18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
this term equals (1 − λ/2)2, i.e., when σ = 1. But φ1 remains non-negative
because the term in brackets is smaller than (1 + λ/2)2.
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